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Perspectives on Political Science 44 (2015): 261–65
Book review by Daniel P. Maher
Jeffrey P. Bishop
The Anticipatory Corpse: Medicine, Power, and the Care of the Dying
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press, 2011
“There is something rotten at the heart of medicine” (22). This charge, while hardly new, may
bear added weight because its author, Jeffrey Bishop, is himself a physician. Then again, maybe not. For,
in Bishop’s understanding, the kind of thinking in which physicians are professionally trained blinds
them to the nature of their own activity and leaves them and the rest of the medical establishment
thoughtlessly drifting toward a practice of medical care(lessness) he does not hesitate to call totalitarian.
An intrinsically flawed medicine, he argues, cannot be fixed by becoming more thoroughly and
successfully scientific, nor by adding generous doses of humanistic supplements. The problem is “built
into the very way that medicine is currently structured” (286). Habits of mechanical and instrumental
thinking, which lend curative powers and thereby prestige to physicians, also constrict, inhibit, or even
stifle the physician’s self-knowledge. “Medicine gives no thought to its metaphysics; it might even deny
having one” (21), and so Bishop must question medicine, “perhaps in the same way that doctors question
the bodies and psyches of persons suffering disease” (95). And this questioning is a “dead gaze” working
violence on the body of the sick (53).
On the medico-scientific view, objects that have been categorized are exhausted, without
remainder. Knowing, then, is a violent act; it is intimately tied to power and, as such, is a
political act. Knowledge is the power to subject one’s object to one’s categories, and it is the
power to control, to bring about the effects one desires in the world. (92)
All of this makes one wonder whether self-diagnosis is possible: does not the charge itself recoil on the
accuser and disqualify him from speaking to us about what medicine is and should be? If medical
training corrupts and corrupts thus, how could the physician heal himself?
In this respect, a troubling ambiguity persists through this book. Just as Bishop wants to write
both for the medical and the non-medical audience, he also wants to claim both the authority of the
physician, who understands medicine better than the rest of us, and that of the non-physician, that is, as
one not afflicted with the ills he diagnoses. One third of the way into the book Bishop writes, “Medicine
is a good, but of course it is not an unqualified good” (95). “Of course” is the non-physician speaking; no
one who gives the question a moment’s thought could fail to see that medicine is a qualified good. And
yet in the opening pages he writes, “Medicine is a good in Western society. Those of us who are engaged
in the practices of the good of medicine—especially in light of the status that medicine has achieved—
think of ourselves as practicing a good that is virtually unqualified” (19). With misplaced selfsatisfaction, physicians are uncomfortable “questioning our motivations and what lurks hidden beneath
our practices.” Physicians, then, cannot see what is “of course” true about their own professional activity,
but Bishop has seen it and seen fit to provide a supporting argument (286) to help reveal the obvious.
And he seems to think all or most of us share enough of this thinking that we need to be similarly
relieved of the limits of our understanding.
It is virtually impossible to think about how to solve any problem in medicine without our
thinking becoming almost immediately mechanical and instrumental. We already live inside a
way of thinking that prevents us from thinking differently; not that thinking differently is
impossible, it is just difficult. (19)
It seems necessary to ask, “What do you mean we, Kemo Sabe?”
Bishop himself overcomes the limitations of a physician’s training with the help of Foucault.
“Foucault is essential to my methodology” (29), and Foucault furnishes the main thesis of the book,

which, in one formulation, runs like this: “in medicine the dead body is the epistemologically normative
body, and medicine’s metaphysics is one dominated by efficient causation—the animation of dead
matter” (22). For nine of the book’s ten chapters, Bishop engages in Foucault-inspired genealogy and
archaeology of modern medicine in its formative history and its contemporary societal or political
constitution. The first nine chapters are divided into three sections by “transitions” Bishop places
between chapters two and three and between chapters seven and eight. The first two chapters deal with
the historical origins of medicine’s focus on death in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. Beginning
in chapter three, Bishop shifts forward to consider present-day medicine as imbued with the mechanical
view of life and death (especially in relation to medical care in the ICU, criteria for diagnosing death, and
the practice of post-mortem organ transplantation). And then in chapters eight and nine, he transitions to
examine how the ancillary aspects of contemporary medicine (e.g., psychological or pastoral care) and the
efforts to improve medicine (through, e.g., palliative care) have been degraded by their absorption of the
scientific standards dominant within modern medicine (26).
In the tenth chapter, Bishop turns from diagnosis to therapy, in which context he finds Foucault
less helpful. There one sees pronounced affinity with the thought of H. Tristram Engelhardt, specifically
with regard to the failure of reason to unite “moral strangers,” which must be remedied by local
communities with shared moral, metaphysical, and even theological views. “It might just be that the
practices of religious communities marginalized in modernity and laughed at as unscientific are the
source of a humane medicine” (313). This more humane medicine would be non-ecumenical. Medicine
must give up its “claims to universal techniques of assessment in physiology, psychology, social
situations, and spirituality” (310) in order to be a richer and more complete response to the call of the
suffering other. To recognize that call and respond to it rightly, “One would have to be immersed in and
to believe in the metaphysical commitments of a particular community at a given time and place” (311–
12). The key to all of this is that medicine cannot be remedied by addition but must be replaced by a new
medical thinking never afflicted by the constricted metaphysics of efficient causation.
As provocative and interesting as it might be to pursue the content of the final chapter, the first
nine chapters are the heart of the book, not the final chapter, which is replete with qualifications and
hesitations. About that heart of the book, it seems necessary to observe that Bishop’s conclusions are for
the most part better than his argument. As Bishop contends, modern scientific medicine has absorbed a
metaphysics that admits only material and efficient causes and denies or ignores formal and final causes.
(On that score, Bishop’s own account is deficient in his failure to recognize the distinction between
natural ends and conscious purposes.) In the first chapter, Bishop uses Foucault’s Birth of the Clinic to
trace the “mutation” (58) of modern medicine as far back as the late eighteenth century, when medical
clinics recognized the motionlessness of death as more intelligible than the moving flux of life. The
emerging emphasis on anatomy (as the analysis of mechanical structure) and on autopsy (as the
investigation that makes most clear the internal character of the once-living being) means that physicians
come to size up their living patients by reference to corpses.
Thus the techniques of the clinic elicited what could only have been known definitively through
dissection of the body. The analytic technique acts in the same manner as the autopsy. Both
reveal disease; the violence of the penetrating gaze is an analogue to the violence of opening the
corpse. This new normative object, the dead body, comes to represent the patient’s living body,
claims Foucault. (55)
In a way, the dead body becomes the measure of all bodies, living or diseased. (59)
In the second chapter, still relying on Foucault’s analysis, Bishop examines how the clinic matured under
the influence of experimental physiology and statistical medicine, both of which, he argues, understand
life as non-living matter in motion. Physiology and statistical medicine are competing approaches to the
common enterprise of making medicine scientific in the modern sense (85–86).
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Bishop makes effective use of text, especially from Claude Bernard, to support his thesis about
the epistemological priority of death to life, but his own argument, some of the time, makes it clear that
this is but a symptom of a more fundamental innovation. That is, the cause of the problems Bishop
explores is the character of modern science, which is something he leaves all but unexplored. Sometimes
Bishop admits the centrality of science: “Medicine, as a social practice, accepts the metaphysics of
modern natural sciences and becomes the ‘standard bearer of western metaphysics’” (93, cf. 20 and 117;
the internal quotation is from Eric Krakauer). On this interpretation, the abandonment of Aristotle’s
metaphysics (204), that is to say, the rejection of formal and final causes in favor of material and efficient
causes, which Bishop identifies as implicit in medicine and as responsible for the notions about life and
death embedded in contemporary medical practices (19), does not originate in medicine itself. And the
trouble begins when medicine embraces the standards of modern science. Indeed, when Bishop criticizes
palliative medicine, pastoral care, and related aspects of the contemporary medical establishment, he
often identifies the drive to meet scientific or social scientific standards as the cause of serious problems.
If medicine absorbs a metaphysics it did not devise, and if that metaphysics gives rise to
contemporary medicine’s constitution and its present problems, it seems necessary for Bishop to give
serious consideration to the epistemology and metaphysics crafted by the founders of modern natural
science. Unfortunately, Bishop also writes as if the difficulties originate within medicine itself.
In this book, I shall claim that the practices surrounding the care of the dying in our time are built
upon this metaphysics of efficient causation, and that this metaphysics became possible precisely
because medicine’s epistemology became grounded on the dead body, understood as an ideal-type. (21,
italics added)
If we take this formulation seriously, an epistemological standard within medicine made possible the
deficient metaphysics that has spread so far and wide.1 In another passage, Bishop states that his book “is
an attempt to explore how our social understandings of death come to structure medicine” (8), as if it
were rather societal changes that changed medicine. In most of the book, Bishop proceeds as if the heart
of the problem is proper to medicine. Occasionally, he nods in the direction of a more fundamental
origin in modern science. For example, in one passage he attributes the decisive break with Aristotle’s
unified four causes to Isaac Newton, but his account of this, for which he seems wholly dependent on the
interpretation of the “radical orthodoxy” author Simon Oliver, is underdeveloped and unpersuasive (65–
66).
Arguably, the phenomena Bishop identifies can be seen in their causes and, therefore, much more
clearly in Descartes, who, along with Francis Bacon, sets out to discredit Aristotle’s philosophy of nature
and to articulate a new understanding of a mechanical nature, purged of formal and final causes, which
was then embraced (as Descartes intended) by medicine as it became scientific in the modern sense. For
example, in his Meditations—which he understood to present the foundations of his physics, the
principles of which would destroy those of Aristotle—Descartes discusses how he naturally conceives of
the human body as a mechanism: “Well the first thought to come to mind was that I had a face, hands,
arms and the whole mechanical structure of limbs which can be seen in a corpse.” 2 (This sentence
Bishop presents George Engel as holding that science itself is not reductive, but medicine became
reductive under the influence of Christian dualism (234). Bishop himself argues that medicine’s dualism
of person and bodily machine is “a more subtle form of dualism than any Christian dualism of body and
soul” (183). This still does not make clear whether Bishop agrees that the troubles originate within
medicine itself or in modern science generally.
2 The Philosophical Writings of Descartes, vol. II, translated by John Cottingham, Robert Stoothoff, and
Dugald Murdoch (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 17. The quoted text belongs to a
rhetorically complicated description (during the second meditation) of what Descartes used to believe.
The conception of bodily nature that emerges from the conclusion of the text is cognitively stripped of
1
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appears tailor-made for Bishop’s interests.) Descartes refines this view as he clarifies his conception of
material nature, ultimately concluding that the vital motions of the body can be accounted for
mechanically, without reference to soul, a move that inaugurates the modern science of biology. Much
more could be said about Descartes in connection with Bishop’s central concerns, and all of it would help
to make clear that what Foucault describes (and Bishop adopts wholesale) is not a matter of historical
accident or “discontinuity” (58), but rather the fulfillment of a project initiated by people like Bacon,
Descartes, and Hobbes. To ignore that, making only superficial reference to Bacon (18) or Avicenna and
Newton (59), is to miss an opportunity to clarify the nature of the issue in its roots.
Moreover, if the problem with medicine stems from a shrunken metaphysics or epistemology
that is communicated through the standards of modern natural science, it would seem that the remedy
would be something along the lines of what Leon Kass once called “a more natural science.” But Bishop
appears to preclude this possibility. For, although he regularly complains about the banishment of
formal and final causality from nature or metaphysics, he also makes dogmatic pronouncements
indicating the impossibility of their recovery, such as his claim that forms and first causes “are not
approachable by the human mind” (90) and that “the concept of a soul is no longer possible for a secular
medicine” (166). Both of these quotations anticipate Bishop’s ultimate conclusion: medicine needs
revelation. Bishop’s rejection of the intelligibility of soul ignores the Greek and Roman precedent of a
secular, biological conception of soul, and it seems also to be an instance of a claim he makes more
generally: “metaphysical consensus in our society cannot be reached” (190). This pronouncement is
particularly difficult to interpret in view of the fact that Bishop argues at great length that a specific
conception of metaphysics has been embraced by all parts of contemporary medicine, as well as by the
Catholic Church (210–11), American law (167), and apparently society as a whole (see 8, 15, and 18).
Bishop devotes nine-tenths of the book to diagnostic critique. The central theme of that critique is
the understanding of life and death, and yet it remains unclear what understanding of life and death
animates the critique. Bishop not only denies that there is a “bright line” between life and death, each of
which is a “state of flux” in the body (193) and both of which include decay (223; cf. 59), he also says, “life
and death have fluid rather than static borders, and these boundaries are political—biopolitical—and not
clearly metaphysical boundaries” (204). Bishop devotes a great deal of text to analyzing and dismantling
the efforts to define death in relation to brain criteria, the practice of post-mortem organ transplantation,
and the role of autonomous choice in determining that one is dead or should be killed. He is repeatedly
and unaccountably imprecise in his use of language during this discussion. For example, when he
introduces the problem of defining death, he says that, prior to the new technologies, definition was
simple: “The cessation of all spontaneous cardiac function and of breathing defined death” (144). There
is no qualification here that the cessation be permanent, and there is no mention of the notion that death
is more fundamentally the ceasing to be of a living being and that permanent cardiopulmonary cessation
signifies that such death has occurred. Precision on these matters is important not only on the merits, but
because Bishop charges others with locating death in the brain, even those who took great pains to avoid
that position (see below). Bishop argues that confusion or ignorance within medicine about the nature of
life and death has led medicine to “absurdity in language, uncanniness in practices, incommensurability
in both language and practices, and incompatibility of goods” (183). His indictment of contemporary
medical practices and the thinking that animates them, especially in relation to the determination of
death, dead-donor organ transplantation, and Schiavo-type cases, is unstinting. And he is no doubt right
that incoherence can be found in many places, but if that incoherence is as unavoidable as he suggests,
formal and final causes, knowable with certainty only in its quantitative dimensions, mechanical in its
motions, and neutral with respect to distinctions between health and disease. Descartes anticipated that
this conception of nature would lead to medical power (see the sixth part of his Discourse on Method).
What Bishop shows us of Bernard is Cartesianism in its medical infancy.
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what is the point of view from which it is discoverable? The logic of his argument seems to be that
medicine embraced death as epistemologically prior to life, but, because death has also been understood
as the absence of life or of the person (which he regards as producing an “insoluble difficulty” (183)),
medicine has got itself all bollixed up. Bishop does not help the reader substantively engage the most
fundamental issues he comes up against; the majority of the book is taken up with critique of the flawed
understandings he finds in others.
The best of this critique is Bishop’s analysis of the efforts to humanize medicine by the addition
of ministrations offered by psychological, sociological, and pastoral experts, who, armed with data sets
and scientized assessment strategies, aim at comprehensive, efficient, and effective management of the ill
person. Just reading this makes one’s skin crawl. Still, unless one is familiar with Bishop’s sources, it is
prudent to reserve judgment, for, in some cases, he does not refrain from bending them to fit his analysis.
For example, in his analysis of the 1981 report Defining Death, produced by the President’s Commission
for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine, he interprets the commission as holding, “death itself is in
the brain” (165). Despite their clear efforts to insist that there is only one kind of death, the death of the
human being, which the report glosses as “the collapse of psycho-physical integrity” and which is not the
death of cells, tissues, or organs, 3 Bishop says that, on the basis of their recognition of the primacy of the
brain in the interrelated systems of heart, lung, and brain, “it stands to reason that the commission
considered the apex of the physiological triangle––namely, the brain––to be the space where life and, in
its absence, death reside” (166). Quite apart from whether one accepts their analysis and whether one
finds their position cogently expressed, the commission is not fairly treated here. In another case, Bishop
misstates Catholic teaching on end-of-life care, where he claims that the traditional teaching identifies
specific technologies as “ordinary” or “extraordinary” means (210). At the same time, he ignores the
qualifications that he quotes and consequently mis-reads John Paul II’s famous statement on artificial
nutrition and hydration as a “life-at-all-cost mentality” (208). Bishop swiftly finds faults in others that
support his general argument, sometimes at the price of precision and accuracy in reporting their views.
By way of conclusion, let me consider one more quotation, which provides occasion for noting
four disparate features of this book. At the beginning of the tenth chapter, Bishop writes,
My point up to now is that the social apparatus of medicine molds and shapes, indeed, subjects
students to the normative stance of a biopolitical regime, in which the health of the body politic
becomes the object of medicine’s inquiry and its domain of management. Death’s dominion
becomes medicine’s dominion. (285)
First, regarding content, Bishop has a general interest in how political authorities shape medicine’s
practice, e.g., in the sense in which the rise of statistics in medicine contributed to making health or public
health a political issue and the sense in which the medical school is a “political space” (85). Nevertheless,
despite what might be suggested by this kind of language, he gives no consideration to, e.g., the
Affordable Care Act as asserting state interest in and authority over the provision of health care.
Second, regarding style, Bishop has a penchant for dramatic formulations, but those formulations
often do not withstand scrutiny. The pace of the writing is brisk, and the piling up of clever flourishes
tends to get in the way of clarity and to degenerate into word play: “Lying hidden before the eyes of the
surgeons, nurses, transplant coordinators, and support staff is the patient, who both is dead and is being
kept alive” (177). When referring to the human body, he readily equates living machine and dead machine
(146), which diminishes the significance of each phrase. In some cases, Bishop takes himself to be
exposing confusions or contradictions embedded in the thinking or practices of others, but unless one
See President’s Commission for the Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and
Behavioral Research, Defining Death: Medical, Legal and Ethical Issues in the Determination of Death
(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1981), 56–58. The report almost always uses the
phrase brain death in quotation marks.
3
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replaces those confusions with something clear and illuminating, the predilection for oxymoronic
formulations wears thin, especially when the writing occasionally issues in (apparently) unintentional
contradictions. For example, after he states, “Patients die to become donors; donors do not die,” he goes
on to refer to “the death of the donor” (184). This does not amplify meaning by illuminating complexity
and ambiguity; it communicates carelessness and imprecision. (Compare the corrected repetition on 64
of the confused formulation on 59.) Also, when discussing people like Claude Bernard, who deny the
reality of both life and death (76), the claim that physicians cause death in order to know or preserve life
hardly captivates. Nevertheless, it remains difficult to understand how Bishop can say, “The purpose of
the physiologist is not to find life,” and, on the same page, “the whole purpose of these experiments in
physiology is the understanding of the complicated motion of animal matter, that is, life” (90).
Third, in the passage quoted above, there is some slippage between the notion that medicine
turns on the dichotomy of health and illness and the notion that it turns on the dichotomy of life and
death. For the first nine chapters, Bishop presents a medicine focused almost exclusively on life and
death, which, admittedly, enables one to make clear certain fundamental relationships, but, as is well
known, also distorts medicine, especially because it positions the doctor as master of life and death.
Bishop exploits this distortion and identifies some genuine confusion in medical thinking, but he does not
examine whether it was reasonable for him to aim his critique at an understanding of medicine
essentially focused on life and death rather than health and illness. Only in the final chapter does he shift
emphasis to the phenomena of health and illness, which makes it easier to see medicine as a more
humane enterprise.
Fourth, the reference to “students” reveals how systematically physician-centric this book is from
front to back. Bishop is not primarily concerned with the life and health of people, in which the physician
plays a marginal and subordinate role. Bishop thinks about medicine as experienced by the physician.
He regards the physician and the physician’s thinking as determinative; the physician wields
epistemological and political power over the patient, who becomes whatever the physician conceives him
or her to be. Bishop sounds the alarm upon having discovered that physicians have an impoverished
view of the lives of patients, and “hesitantly” he suggests a solution:
With a more careful attunement to fully embodied life, could medicine strike a more humble pose
toward the body if it understood that technology often distorts the being of the patient and
replaces function without replacing purpose? Do bodies not have an integral value quite apart
from the values that those with the power to interpret impose upon it? Does a body, with its
meanings and purposes, not exceed the categories into which a doctor might put it? (312–13)
Note the persistence, on the book’s final pages, in referring to the sick person as “the body.” Note the
atmosphere of broaching uncharted territory when suggesting that the human person is not, after all,
adequately grasped as a biochemical machine. It is as if he were to say to us, “I used to be arrogant and
look down on you, but do not fear any longer. I recognize my prior mistake, and I have healed myself. I
now affirm that your life has meaning.”
A normal person—at least, one not intimidated by the title “doctor” and one not afflicted by
iatrogenic confusions—would chuckle at this attempted humility but would still welcome the belated
discovery and might expect it to mean that the physician is accepting an appropriately diminished place.
But that is not Bishop’s conclusion. Bishop suggests that medicine can only be fully healed when the
physicians themselves embrace the theological, religious, and metaphysical commitments or practices of
their patients. He seems to think that the “purposes” that invest the patient’s life with meaning will not
be real unless they are acknowledged or granted by the physician. He does not see the physician as really
subordinate to the natural ends and the moral principles that call medicine into existence as an art, ends
and principles that are at least as accessible to the layman as to the physician. He anticipates these
principles as able to govern medicine, apparently, only when the physician personally endorses them as a
physician. In that case, the physician will know how to interpret the call of the suffering other, and, as he
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puts it near the end of the book, “Careful attunement to the call of the suffering other might move the
soul of medicine toward purposes that exceed the management of bodies” (311).
Given his critique of totalizing medical care through the absorption of social science standards
into pastoral and palliative care, Bishop ought to see but does not see or does not mind that, were
physicians to join their technical power with stewardship over the moral and religious goals of life,
nothing would be outside their purview as physicians. Such a medicine would be in a position to be even
more totalitarian than the “biopsychosociospiritual” medicine Bishop decries. Indeed, it would seem to
be a dereliction of duty for such a physician to fail to use his or her professional resources to lead all
people to the good life. Surely, Bishop does not really want this, but his physician-centric view and the
vagueness of his ultimate conclusion leave him making suggestions in this direction.
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